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The Myth of Uniformity

Do the United States Sentencing Guidelines embody a
coherent system of real-offense sentencing? The opinion of
the “remedy majority” in Booker rests, in no small measure, on an assumption that they do. Writing for the remedy
majority, Justice Breyer determined that Congress wanted
defendants to be sentenced in a uniform fashion based on
their real-world conduct, as opposed to their crimes of conviction.1 More specifically, Congress wanted to ensure
similar treatment for defendants whose real-world conduct
was similar, while also ensuring different treatment for
defendants whose real-world conduct was different.2 In
Breyer’s view, the jury-based sentencing procedures envisioned by the Booker dissenters would defeat Congress’s
preferences because, among other things, such procedures
would undermine the scheme of sentencing uniformity
embodied by the Guidelines.3 Thus, he concluded, the jurybased system should be rejected in favor of a judge-based
system that at least employs the Guidelines on an advisory
basis. The unspoken—but critical—assumption is that
adherence to the Guidelines (expected to be greater in the
judge-based advisory system) actually advances uniformity
goals in a robust fashion. There are good reasons, however,
to doubt this assumption.
To be sure, the Guidelines do a wonderful job of identifying normally relevant offense characteristics and
ensuring that they are taken into account at sentencing.
Yet, this accomplishment does not amount, in and of
itself, to uniformity in any meaningful sense of the term.
Consider, for instance, a sentencing scheme that imposed
the death penalty in every case in which a victim suffered
physical injury, no matter how slight. Such a scheme
would also do a wonderful job of ensuring that a normally
relevant offense characteristic is taken into account at sentencing, but no one would confuse such a scheme with a
coherent system of uniformity. Nor would it even necessarily do a better job of advancing uniformity goals than a
scheme that imposed the same flat sentence on all offenders—a scheme that would at least have the virtue of
avoiding inappropriate sentence enhancements for minor
or unforeseeable injuries.4 The Guidelines, of course, are
not nearly as crude as this hypothetical system, but their
length and technical detail mask a tendency toward some
of the very same types of difficulties.

This is not to say that the jury-based system of the
Booker dissenters would do a better job of achieving uniformity than the advisory system preferred by the
remedy majority. My point, rather, is that neither system
seems especially well suited to advance uniformity objectives. In light of the Guidelines that we have—as
opposed to some sort of hypothetical guidelines that
actually implement a coherent vision of uniformity—the
desire of Congress to achieve uniformity, standing alone,
offers little help in deciding how much weight ought to
be given the Guidelines or what procedures should be
used to implement them. No matter how attractive uniformity might be in theory, we should not exalt
uniformity to the detriment of other important objectives as we address the important questions we now
confront about the future of the Guidelines.
The article develops these points as follows. Part I considers the meaning of the term “uniformity,” as the Court
seems to be using it. Part II summarizes key failings of
the Guidelines from a uniformity perspective. Part III discusses the implications of this uniformity analysis for the
ongoing judicial debate over how much weight ought to be
given the Guidelines after Booker. Part IV suggests a possible restructuring of the Guidelines.

MICHAEL M.
O’HEAR
Associate Professor,
Marquette University
Law School

I. Framing the Issue: What Is “Uniformity”?

In the Booker remedy opinion, Justice Breyer did not
offer a rigorous definition of uniformity but, broadly
speaking, seemed to have in mind the twin goals of (1)
similar treatment of similarly situated offenders and
(2) different treatment of differently situated
offenders.5 Confusingly, elsewhere in the sentencing
literature, these two goals are sometimes given the separate labels of “uniformity” and “proportionality,”
respectively.6 In this article, I will follow Booker’s lead
in using “uniformity” to embrace both objectives.
Where necessary, I will disaggregate the problems of
inappropriately similar treatment from inappropriately
different treatment by referring to “false positives”
(i.e., imposing different sentences on offenders who
are actually similarly situated) and “false negatives”
(i.e., imposing similar sentences on offenders who are
actually differently situated).
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The Booker remedy opinion offers hypothetical examples of these problems, which it uses to illustrate the
drawbacks of a charge-offense system. First, there are the
contrasting cases of “Smith” and “Jones,” both of whom
violate the Hobbs Act:
Smith threatens to injure a co-worker unless the coworker advances him a few dollars from the interstate
company’s till; Jones, after similarly threatening the coworker, causes far more harm by seeking far more
money, by making certain that the co-worker’s family
is aware of the threat, by arranging for deliveries of
dead animals to the co-worker’s home to show he is
serious, and so forth.7
Although the behavior of Smith and Jones is very different (in the words of the remedy majority, “the known
harmful consequences of their actions are different”), a
charge-offense system would result in the same sentence
in both cases because the same statute has been violated.8
This is an example of a false negative: Jones’s sentence is
not enhanced relative to Smith’s, although it should be.
Second, there are the contrasting cases of the former
felons “Johnson” and “Jackson”:
[E]ach . . . engages in identical criminal behavior:
threatening a bank teller with a gun, securing $10,000,
and injuring an innocent bystander while fleeing the
bank. Suppose prosecutors charge Johnson with one
crime (say, illegal gun possession) and Jackson with
another (say, bank robbery).9
Under a charge-offense system, the prosecutor’s charging
decision makes all the difference, producing inappropriately different sentences for Johnson and Jackson. This
would be an example of a false positive.
All of this analysis, of course, assumes some sort of
coherent underlying theory of sentencing. After all, every
case is unique in some way. We cannot speak of uniformity in any meaningful sense without some ability to
distinguish which characteristics ought to result in different sentences. Indeed, much of the appeal of uniformity
rests on the assumption that uniform sentences will result
in the advancement of the legitimate purposes of punishment in a consistent and principled fashion across the full
range of federal criminal cases.
While the Booker remedy majority does not provide
any systematic elaboration of its views on this point, the
Smith/Jones and Johnson/Jackson hypotheticals suggest
an emphasis on two types of variables in the uniformity
calculus: (1) the “known harmful consequences” of the
offender’s conduct and (2) the offender’s criminal history. This approach to uniformity resonates with
Congress’s directive that courts “avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”10 This
approach also mirrors the Court’s Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis.11
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Our definition of uniformity can be refined on this
basis. Holding criminal history constant, uniformity
demands similar treatment for similar conduct and different treatment for different conduct. But how do we know
what aspects of conduct count? The statute refers to
“guilty” conduct, while the Court refers to knowledge and
“harmful consequences.” Implicitly, there seems to be
some contemplation of “just deserts,” i.e., a system in
which sentences would be adjusted based on those aspects
of an offender’s conduct that tend to aggravate or mitigate
the moral blameworthiness of that conduct.12
This observation is not intended to equate uniformity
with a strict system of just deserts. Indeed, the emphasis
on criminal history, alongside conduct, is at least arguably
inconsistent with just deserts.13 On the other hand, uniformity cannot be an infinitely malleable concept; the
objective holds little intrinsic appeal if it lacks some sort of
grounding in the leading recognized theories of criminal
punishment, including just deserts. The Court’s apparent
focus on harm and state of mind is perfectly consistent
with this view. Thus, in considering how the Guidelines
actually distinguish among offenders with similar records,
I will assume that just deserts offers an appropriate and
helpful point of reference.
II. The Guidelines’ Uniformity Problems
A. Circumstantial Evidence: History of
the Guidelines

As drafted by the first Commission, the Guidelines were the
product of what Justice Breyer himself has characterized as
a series of “compromises,” perhaps the most important
being the decision to employ past sentencing practices as a
baseline.14 While past practices surely reflected a sensitivity
to the “known harmful consequences” of offenders’ conduct, they may have also reflected other considerations that
do not have as clear a bearing on uniformity (penalties for
going to trial, amenability to rehabilitation, disadvantaged
upbringing, parole expectation and so forth). Moreover,
whatever uniformity could be achieved by the averaging of
past practices may have been further diluted by other sorts
of compromises. These include the decisions to limit the
number of offense characteristics as a matter of administrative convenience15 and otherwise to deviate from past
practices as to matters that were of special concern to particular commissioners, such as the sentencing of white-collar
criminals.16
More importantly, while the Guidelines have retained
the basic framework created by the original Commission, it
is important to recognize that, with respect to many offense
areas, the Guidelines have become every bit as much a
product of Congress as they are of the Commission. This
fact alone, on its face, should raise serious doubts about the
role of uniformity in the Guidelines. Subject to two very
different institutional masters, it would be rather surprising to discover that the Guidelines embody a coherent
scheme of identifying and assigning weights to relevant
offense characteristics—particularly given the tendency of
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one of those institutions toward ad hoc gestures of condemnation of the crime du jour. And, indeed, Congress’s
habitual reliance on crude mandatory minimums—dutifully worked into the fabric of the Guidelines by the
Commission, but vigorously criticized by Breyer
himself17—demonstrates the tension between uniformity
ideals and the reality of congressional intervention. One
might also consider Congress’s rejection of the Commission’s attempt to soften the 100:1 crack cocaine policy,18 the
substantial increases in sentences for economic crimes that
were reluctantly adopted by the Commission in 2003 as a
result of pressure from Congress,19 and Congress’s rewriting of the Guidelines to toughen the sentencing for child
pornography and sex crimes.20
B. Missing Uniformity Factors

To be sure, “missing” sentencing factors may, in principle, be taken into account through the departure
mechanism, but departures are never required under the
Guidelines, and, in practice, upward departures, at least,
are quite rare.25 Likewise, missing factors may be taken
into account in the selection of a sentence within a range,
but, again, this would be a purely discretionary matter,
and, in any event, Guidelines ranges are generally quite
narrow. To the extent that a sentencing judge does take
into account the full range of factors bearing on just punishment, this will, in many cases, be more a result of the
limited unguided discretion allowed by the Guidelines and
less a result of any mandatory uniformity embedded in the
Guidelines.26
C. Dubious Factors

Despite their length and technical detail, the Guidelines
are actually surprisingly silent on a number of important
considerations bearing on the blameworthiness of an
offender’s conduct. Perhaps most notably, the Guidelines
devote little attention to mens rea or motive.21 The Guidelines instead focus on the magnitude of actual or
foreseeable harm. Yet, even as to harm, the Guidelines
employ a scattershot, unsystematic approach.22
Consider Smith and Jones, the two extortionists.
They are supposed to get different sentences based on
the different known harmful consequences of their
behavior, which are apparently composed of (1) different
amounts of money sought and (2) different degrees of
fear instilled in the victim and his family. As to the first
offense characteristic, the extortion guideline would distinguish between Smith and Jones only to the extent that
the monetary loss in the two cases happened to fall into
different recognized loss categories.23 (More will be said
about loss tables in Section D.) As to the second, the
extortion guideline lacks any generalized offense characteristic dealing with victim fear. Instead, the guideline
seems to get at fear through a host of more specific
offense characteristics, such as whether there was a
death threat, a firearm discharge, or a kidnapping. It is
not clear whether any of these enhancements would
apply to Jones or, if so, apply any differently to Jones
than to Smith.
Or consider Johnson and Jackson, the bank robbers. It
appears that the Guidelines would mandate similar sentences based on the identical harm threatened and caused
by their conduct. But should they really be treated the
same? Assume that Jackson’s gun was loaded but Johnson’s was not, indicating that Jackson’s conduct was more
dangerous and reflected an aggravated mens rea. Assume
further that Jackson was negligent in injuring the
bystander while fleeing but that Johnson undertook all
reasonable precautions to prevent any harm from occurring during flight. Neither of these, nor numerous other
potential distinguishing characteristics, would necessarily
be considered under the Guidelines,24 leading to a false
negative in the sentencing of the two robbers.

The Guidelines not only exclude some factors that ought
generally to be part of the uniformity analysis but also
include a variety of factors that may undermine uniformity. For instance, the acceptance of responsibility
provision gives rise to substantial sentence differences
based chiefly on the mode of conviction.27 Thus, Jackson
and Johnson—despite identical conduct and identical
records—would almost certainly receive quite different
sentences under the Guidelines if one pled guilty and the
other went to trial. The acceptance provision may or may
not be good policy, but it seems at odds with uniformity
objectives.28 The substantial assistance and fast-track provisions raise similar concerns.29
Apart from such general provisions, the Guidelines
also include a host of dubious offense-specific aggravating
factors. In the robbery guideline, for instance, why are carjackers singled out for a special enhancement? Why
should the robbers of financial institutions receive longer
sentences than other sorts of robbers? It is hard to see why
targeting a car or a bank merits extra punishment per se
in the same sort of way as does inflicting bodily injury during the course of a robbery.
D. The Problem of Weighting

Even if the Guidelines were to include all of the relevant
uniformity factors (and exclude all of the irrelevant one), the
Guidelines would still not function effectively as a uniformity regime if they did not ascribe an appropriate weight to
each of the factors. Consider Smith and Jones again. If
Jones’s conduct is only a little more blameworthy than
Smith’s, but the Guidelines mandate a dramatically longer
sentence for Jones, then the cause of uniformity may actually be undermined, not advanced, by the Guidelines. Or
consider the possibility of a third hypothetical extortion
defendant, Baker, who presents a different mix of aggravating circumstances that place him between Smith and Jones
in blameworthiness. If Baker’s offense characteristics are
given too much weight, or Jones’s too little, then Baker and
Jones might be treated the same—a false negative.
And the Guidelines have indeed been accused of giving
an unjustifiably heavy weight to numerous offense and
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offender characteristics. For instance, two of the most
prominent targets of criticism in this regard have been the
provisions dealing with crack and illegal reentry by
felons.30
More generally, weighting problems are suggested by
the standard Guidelines approach to aggravating circumstances: grouping together broad ranges of conduct with
“cliffs” at the margins, i.e., tipping points at which very
small differences in blameworthiness produce sometimes
quite different offense levels. Offenders at the bottom of
the range for a given offense characteristic will have that
characteristic overweighted relative to other offenders with
the same characteristic, while offenders at the top will have
the characteristic underweighted. Thus, a robber causing a
$50,000 loss is treated the same as a robber causing an
$11,000 loss but differently than a robber causing a
$50,001 loss. Robbers who possess or brandish a firearm
receive the same offense level—although these categories
of possessing and brandishing encompass a broad range of
conduct—but the moment the firearm is discharged a
quite different offense level becomes applicable—even
though one can readily imagine circumstances in which
the discharger creates little more danger or fear than the
brandisher. (Imagine, for instance, a wild shot in the air at
some distance from a safely concealed victim versus a gun
brandished menacingly just inches from the victim’s face.)
To be sure, there may be some balancing out in the
aggregate: some defendants will benefit unfairly by being at
the top of one range but suffer an offsetting detriment by
being at the bottom of another range. Additionally, the cliff
problems are theoretically softened by the Guidelines’ use
of overlapping sentencing ranges, so that different offense
levels do not necessarily produce different sentences. Given
the relative infrequency of top-of-the-range sentences in
practice, though, this safeguard may be more theoretical
than real.31 In any event, the uniformity concerns remain as
to defendants who happen to be at the top or bottom of the
range with respect to multiple offense characteristics. This
concern is exacerbated by the ability of police and prosecutors to manipulate some offense characteristics (e.g., drug
trafficking quantities in sting operations) so as to ensure
that defendants “fall off the cliff.”
A related weighting concern is the double-counting of
offense characteristics. Many guidelines contain a variety
of overlapping characteristics that seem to be getting at
the same underlying concerns. When several such characteristics are triggered in the same case, offense levels may
quickly mount out of proportion to the real blameworthiness of a defendant’s conduct. Thus, for instance, in the
robbery guideline, the weapons and abduction characteristics both seem to be getting at fear and danger caused by
the defendant’s conduct, and they will often be found
together—presumably, few abductions occur without the
defendant at least brandishing a weapon of some kind.
When both characteristics are present—for instance,
when a gun-toting robber briefly abducts a victim (without
causing any bodily injury)—the total enhancement may
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amount to ten levels. By comparison, this is considerably
more than the six-level enhancement for causing a lifethreatening bodily injury. Similarly, I have shown
elsewhere how a minor spill of nontoxic chemicals may
trigger several overlapping characteristics in the environmental sentencing guideline such that the spiller may
receive a longer sentence than other environmental criminals who put lives in imminent danger.32
Yet, there is a more fundamental weighting problem
embodied in the Guidelines’ version of uniformity: its insistence on national uniformity, without regard to varying
community norms across the country. After all, there is no
objective, universal yardstick to tell us how many months in
prison a death threat is worth, or the discharge of a firearm,
or a serious bodily injury. The moral significance of such
offense characteristics cannot be meaningfully assessed
without reference to community norms, and some communities will surely weight some offense characteristics quite
differently than will other communities. For instance, as
Judge Broderick once observed in these pages, gun possession means something quite different in the hunting
cultures of western states than it does in violence-weary
inner cities in the East.33 A national-average weighting
scheme is almost certainly getting the weights quite wrong
in a great many districts. Indeed, Congress actually contemplated this possibility and authorized the Commission to
incorporate regional variation into the Guidelines.34 While
the Commission did not take advantage of this authority,
regional variation should not be considered inconsistent
with Congress’s vision of uniformity.
E. Complexity

The Guidelines’ notorious technical complexity undermines their uniformity objectives in at least two respects.
First, as Professors Ruback and Wroblewski have demonstrated, the sheer number of sentencing factors
recognized by the Guidelines diminishes the reliability of
sentencing decisions, that is, the tendency of the process
to produce the same result if repeated.35 Sentencing factors tend to be defined in the Guidelines such that
reasonable people may differ as to how they should be
applied in particular cases. Think, for instance, of the distinctions made in the robbery guideline between “bodily
injury” and “serious bodily injury.” The presence of many
such factors can have a dramatic cumulative effect on
overall reliability.36 Empirical studies of Guidelines application support this concern, showing, for instance, that
different probation officers given the same set of facts
come up with quite different offense level calculations.37
Second, complexity diminishes the motivation of
judges.38 Research from organizational psychology
demonstrates that “professionals do not like to be told how
to do their jobs, particularly by nonprofessionals,” often
causing detailed rules and procedures to be ignored by
those charged with implementing them.39 As Ruback and
Wroblewski argue, this dynamic of resentment has played
an important role in federal sentencing: “Judges dislike
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their supervisors (i.e., Congress and the Sentencing Commission) specifying procedures for them as if they were
hourly workers, not professionals.”40 There should be little wonder that studies found circumvention of the
Guidelines—i.e., the manipulation of fact-finding and
charges of conviction to avoid imposition of a sentence
required by the Guidelines—to be common,41 while
judges were said to be in a state of “rebellion” against the
drug guidelines.42
In light of these reliability and motivation concerns,
there is good reason to doubt whether the system as a
whole has done—or is capable of doing—a good job in
practice of ensuring similar sentences for the similarly situated and different sentences for the differently situated.
These practical concerns would be just as strong even if
the Guidelines somehow contained all of the right
offense characteristics and weighted them all appropriately. Indeed, there may be something of a Catch-22 here:
the better the Guidelines succeed in specifically identifying and weighting all factors relevant to uniformity, the
more complex the Guidelines will grow—and the less
likely that the Guidelines will result in consistent outcomes in practice.
F. Prosecutorial Control

Prosecutors retain vast plea-bargaining and charging discretion under the Guidelines. To be sure, the drafters of
the Guidelines sought to constrain the significance of that
discretion through a real-offense sentencing system,
which theoretically diminishes the importance of the
charges of conviction. However, the drafters apparently
did not fully appreciate the extent of prosecutors’ ability to
undermine the real-offense system through such mechanisms as fact bargaining and substantial assistance
departures.43 On the whole, judges have shown little willingness (or perhaps capacity) to insist on real-offense
sentences in the face of a competing prosecutorial
agenda.44 Thus, in practice, the effectiveness of the Guidelines uniformity scheme is limited by the motivation of
prosecutors to implement that scheme faithfully. However, prosecutors must balance fidelity to the Guidelines
against a host of competing interests, such as speedy case
processing. Studies of Guidelines circumvention tend to
support suspicions that prosecutors have limited
allegience to the uniformity principle.45
G. Summary

The Guidelines do not embody a robust system of sentencing uniformity, but, to borrow Breyer’s own
characterization, a set of “compromises.”46 Uniformity
has been merely one of numerous competing considerations of public policy and political expedience.
The Commission’s compromises may or may not have
been good ones. I do not mean to suggest here that the
Commission ought to have embraced strict uniformity as
the dominant consideration in the Guidelines sentencing
process, which would have entailed, among other things,

grappling with the extraordinarily difficult challenge of
prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, in light of the Catch-22 of
complexity, uniformity in any truly rigorous form is probably unattainable.
In any event, the point is that questions about the
desirability of judicial adherence to the Guidelines as they
exist cannot usefully be equated with questions about the
desirability of uniformity in sentencing as an abstract
proposition.
Consider the remedy dispute in Booker itself. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that Breyer is correct in one of
his central premises: under a voluntary Guidelines system, sentences will more frequently be enhanced on the
basis of applicable Guidelines factors than they would be
under the dissenters’ jury-based system. Even if this claim
were true, the result would not necessarily be greater system-wide uniformity. The majority’s remedy will likely
produce fewer false negatives (i.e., treating differently situated defendants the same), but it may produce more false
positives, due, for instance, to the Guidelines’ reliance on
more or less arbitrary cliffs and other dubious sentencing
factors.47 It is not clear, a priori, which effect (false negatives under the dissenters’ remedy or false positives under
the majority’s) would be more pronounced. (Nor is it clear,
in a criminal justice system that otherwise seeks to err in
favor of the defendant, that false negatives should be
regarded as an equally serious problem as false positives.)
In the end, it seems to me that a preference for uniformity
does not really answer the remedy question; the question
must instead be answered by reference to other considerations, such as the likely transaction costs of the jury
system or the contribution of jury decision making to the
perceived legitimacy of sentencing outcomes.
III. Implementing Booker

Viewing the Guidelines as an ad hoc set of compromises,
rather than a coherent uniformity scheme, may help to
illuminate some of the important questions that are being
raised as lower courts try to implement Booker. In particular, this part will address the debate between Judges
Adelman and Cassell as to the weight that should be given
the Guidelines in the new “advisory” regime.
In United States v. Ranum, Judge Adelman held that
“under Booker, courts must treat the guidelines as just one
of a number of sentencing factors.”48 In particular, Adelman held that sentencing judges must now weigh all of
the sentencing purposes and considerations identified in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which are sometimes in conflict with
the Guidelines.49 Judges, he suggested, must resolve those
conflicts on a case-by-case basis, sometimes rejecting the
Guidelines, “so long as the ultimate sentence is reasonable and carefully supported by reasons tied to the
§ 3553(a) factors.”50
Judge Cassell rejected this approach in United States v.
Wilson, holding that variances from the Guidelines should
be “rare,” i.e., “only in unusual cases for clearly identified
and persuasive reasons.”51 In particular, Cassell objected
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to Adelman’s reliance on offender characteristics at sentencing.52
While the Cassell–Adelman debate touches on a number of points, the most important for present purposes is
Cassell’s claim that “[h]eavy reliance on the Guidelines is
the only way to implement the congressional directive
[contained in § 3553(a)] for courts to ‘avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.’”53
Cassell argued
If each judge follows his or her own views of ‘just punishment’ and ‘adequate deterrence,’ the result will be a
system in which prison terms will depend on what the
judge ate for breakfast on the day of sentencing and
other irrelevant factors. . . .
. . . The result will almost inevitably be that defendants
sentenced in the Eastern District of Wisconsin will
serve different sentences for the same offense than
similarly-situated defendants sentenced in the District
of Utah.54
This reasoning suffers from the same flaw as that of
the remedy majority in Booker, that is, equating Guidelines adherence with uniformity. Yet, as wee have seen,
the Guidelines distinguish among defendants based on a
host of considerations that have little bearing on the relative seriousness of their records or blameworthiness of
their conduct. Moreover, even if adherence to the Guidelines does diminish the importance of what the judge had
for breakfast on the day of sentencing, it may actually
enhance the importance of what the prosecutor had for
breakfast on the day of plea bargaining. (Indeed, in a
Guidelines regime that embodies not a scientific system
of uniform punishment but a series of ad hoc compromises, one wonders about the digestive influences that
have operated over the years on key Commissioners and
members of Congress.)
Nor is there any reason to believe that the Cassell test
will do anything to ensure that sentences in Wisconsin are
the same as sentences in Utah. Sentences varied considerably from district to district even before Booker,55 and it is
hard to see how those patterns will change under any version of the Booker regime. Such variation is a predictable
result of the Guidelines’ complexity and (in the absence of
rigorous, binding, nationwide standards for charging and
plea bargaining) the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Indeed, it is not even clear that such variation is a bad
thing; variation may reflect legitimate differences in community values and crime-control needs.56
In sum, while there may be a number of compelling
reasons for sentencing judges to give “great weight” to the
Guidelines, a desire to “avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct” should not be
counted among them. Quite the contrary, variances from
the Guidelines may be used appropriately in some cases to
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soften a number of the disparities that are woven into the
fabric of the Guidelines themselves, such as the crackcocaine disparity, the implicit trial penalty of § 3E1.1, and
the endemic phenomena of cliffs and double-counting.
IV. Legislative Responses: Restructuring the Guidelines
After Booker

If the pre-Booker Guidelines regime were viewed as a functional, coherent system of sentencing uniformity, then
there might be a strong case for a legislative response to
Booker that would effectively restore the old regime. On
the other hand, viewing the old regime as a set of ad hoc
compromises diminishes the immediate appeal of restoration. Thus, I share the view of many organizations and
commentators that the Commission and Congress should
take a wait-and-see approach, carefully evaluating the evolution of the new regime over a period of time.57
That said, the discussion of uniformity in this article
leads me to reiterate and expand upon a proposal I have
made elsewhere for restructuring the Guidelines.58 Booker
offers a unique opportunity for Congress and the Commission to revisit the most fundamental structural
decisions that were made in crafting the Guidelines. One
such decision that has proven flawed was the decision to
use a “piecemeal” approach to evaluating offense severity,
that is, enhancing sentences on the basis of a large number of narrow, decontextualized, and nominally objective
offense characteristics (e.g., did the defendant have a gun,
was it discharged, was anyone hurt, how badly, how much
money was taken, was a bank targeted).
This piecemeal approach suffers many defects. It tends
to exclude softer, but still enormously important, variables, such as mens rea. It discourages consideration and
discussion of the moral significance of the offense characteristics that do count, thus draining the sentencing
process of any meaning for the participants apart from the
bottom-line pronouncement of a sentence length. Moreover, because the Commission cannot possibly anticipate
all of the fact patterns to which a guideline will be applied,
the piecemeal approach inevitably leads to the overcounting or undercounting of particular variables in particular
cases.
Due to its complexity, the piecemeal approach engenders reliability and motivation problems. Its transparency
invites manipulation by police and prosecutors (e.g.,
through fact bargaining or “sentencing entrapment”59). Its
apparent lack of integrity invites ad hoc congressional tinkering.
As against the piecemeal approach, I have suggested a
more open-ended inquiry into such broadly defined sentencing factors as dangerousness and mens rea.60
Restructured this way, the Guidelines would assign different weights on an offense-specific basis to the varying
degrees to which the sentencing factors are present (e.g.,
extreme, high, moderate, and low danger created by the
defendant’s conduct, relative to other defendants who
have committed the same type of offense). The Guidelines
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would offer several specific examples of fact patterns for
each category, but there would necessarily be a certain
amount of subjectivity in the determinations, at least at
the margins. Additionally, given the breadth of the sentencing factors (e.g., “low danger”), some dissimilar
conduct would necessarily be lumped together.
In light of the subjectivity at the margins, as well as the
use of a smaller number of broader categories within each
offense type, we would effectively abandon the goal of rigorous, nationwide uniformity. On the other hand, it is not clear
that rigorous, nationwide uniformity can be achieved in practice. Nor is it clear that nationwide uniformity (as against a
community-based model) is even an appropriate goal.
We would gain a more meaningful sentencing
process, as judges (or potentially juries) would be effectively invited to contextualize and assess the true
significance of relevant offense characteristics. In so
doing, we would retain a weaker, less demanding form of
uniformity. This is not the same thing as “what the judge
had for breakfast.” We would still have guidelines that
make real distinctions among defendants, at least where
the differences in the blameworthiness of their conduct
are obvious and important. While there would be some
imprecision around the borders, there would also be relatively clear cases in the heartland of each category.

human dignity of criminal offenders. This sort of dignitary agenda has been more manifest in capital cases,65
where the Court has also appropriately emphasized that
sentencing procedures should affirm the individual worth
of victims.66
In any event, the Court’s growing interest in procedural justice at sentencing invites fresh thinking about the
subject. I would suggest that the analysis begin with this
question: What procedures will assure both offenders and
victims that they have had a fair chance to tell their sides
of the story to an attentive decision maker who actually
cares about what they have to say?67 In evaluating potential legislative responses to Booker, for instance, I think it
would be helpful to know how offenders and victims perceive the fairness of sentencing juries. To the extent that
juries can contribute to perceptions of fairness at sentencing, they ought to receive serious consideration. Of course,
this and other innovations become more feasible and
attractive once we recognize that uniformity is not a categorical imperative at sentencing, but only one goal to be
pursued along with many others, including procedural
justice.
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until it begins to conflict with substantive aims.62 “We will
do the right thing with procedure,” the merits majority
seems to be saying, “and let the substantive chips fall
where they may.” This sort of emphasis on procedural justice has influenced the Court’s Eighth Amendment capital
sentencing jurisprudence,63 but, until Apprendi, it rarely
played much of a role in noncapital cases.
We should welcome this renewed appreciation for procedural justice. At the same time, we should recognize
that the vision of procedural justice embodied in Apprendi
and its progeny is a rather parsimonious one, focusing on
jury trial rights for fact-finding in certain limited circumstances. In ways that have not yet been well explained by
the Court, these rights seem to arise from concerns about
individual liberty in the face of state power and the democratic legitimacy of sentencing decisions.64 Faintly visible
in the Court’s reasoning may be a broader imperative that
sentencing procedures embody respect for the essential

4

5

6

7
8
9
10
11

12

13

14
15
16
17

18

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 761 (2005).
Id. at 760–61.
Id.
Recall that the term “uniformity” is here used to encompass
not just different treatment for the differently situated but
also similar treatment for the similarly situated. See infra
Part I.
This is clear, for instance, in Breyer’s discussion of the contrasting Smith/Jones and Johnson/Jackson hypotheticals.
See infra text accompanying notes 7–9.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 13 (1988).
125 S. Ct. at 760.
Id. at 761.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36–37 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with use of proportionality analysis for
determining constitutionality of prison sentences and identifying key variables as real-offense conduct and
circumstances, criminal history, and length of prison term).
See Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender:
Punishment, Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 154–59 (2004).
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of
Desert, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 453, 492–493 (1997) (arguing that
weight of prior convictions should be, at most, “rather modest” when determining desert).
Breyer, supra note 6, at 17–18.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 18–20.
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 570 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“Mandatory minimum statutes are fundamentally inconsistent with Congress’ simultaneous effort to
create a fair, honest, and rational sentencing system through
the use of Sentencing Guidelines.”).
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 1 (1997).

FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER

•

V O L . 1 7 , N O. 4

•

APRIL 2005

255

04.FSR17.4_249-257.qxd

7/12/05

19

20

21

22
23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

256

1:41 PM

Page 256

See Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres?: The
Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal
Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373,
376 (2004).
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 401(a), (i), 117 Stat.
650 (2003).
See O’Hear, supra note 9, at 220-222 (describing “missing
culpability factors” in environmental guidelines); Douglas A.
Berman, The Model Penal Code Second: Might “Film Schools”
Be in Need of a Remake?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 166
(2003) (noting general criticism that guidelines downplay
mens rea considerations).
See O’Hear, supra note 12, at 225–30, 266–67.
The relevant extortion guideline would appear to be U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.2.
The relevant robbery guideline would appear to be U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1.
In 2002, fewer than 1 percent of cases involved an upward
departure. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 (2004).
From the standpoint of uniformity, this residual discretion
contemplated by the Guidelines is a two-edged sword: while
it may be used to bring more aspects of the offender’s conduct to bear at sentencing, it may also be used to dilute the
significance of conduct and record by authorizing the consideration of offender characteristics and other considerations
that do not relate to uniformity.
See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and
Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1539 (1997).
I assume here, for reasons discussed in Part I above, a definition of uniformity based exclusively on record and offense
conduct. Admittedly, a consistently applied plea discount
might arguably fall within the parameters of a broader vision
of uniformity, in which sentences are appropriately adjusted on
the basis of any consideration that relates to any legitimate
purpose of punishment. A plea discount, of course, advances
the purpose of encouraging guilty pleas. One may, of course,
question whether the encouragement of guilty pleas is a legitimate purpose of punishment. Even accepting this premise,
however, the acceptance provision runs into difficulties from a
uniformity standpoint. First, while it may operate as such in
most cases, the acceptance provision is not, strictly speaking,
a plea discount; rather, it is a vaguely worded sentencing
adjustment that embodies conflicting purposes and has been
subject to conflicting judicial interpretations. Id. at 1510–12.
Second, to the extent that the acceptance provision does
embody a plea discount, the operation of this plea discount in
practice is subject to inconsistencies among prosecutors in
plea-bargaining practices. Indeed, the Feeney Amendment
recently enhanced the importance of prosecutorial discretion
in the implementation of § 3E1.1 by requiring a prosecutor’s
motion as a predicate to the award of a full three-point reduction.
See, e.g., United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 2005 WL 323703
(E.D. Wis. 2005) (finding that fast-track programs create
unwarranted disparities). See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW
WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF SENTENCING REFORM xiii (2004) (finding substantial assistance departures, among several Guidelines provisions
thought to promote disparity, to be responsible for greatest
amount of variation in sentence lengths).
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 2005 WL 549057 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (crack); United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 2005 WL
323703 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (illegal reentry).

FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER

•

31

32
33

34

35

36

37

38
39
40
41

42

43

44

45
46
47

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56

57

58

V O L . 1 7 , N O. 4

In 2002, about 60 percent of sentences were at the Guidelines
minimum, while only about 10 percent were at the Guidelines
maximum. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 25, at 59.
O’Hear, supra note 12, at 226.
Vincent L. Broderick, Local Factors in Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT.
REP. 314, 314 (1993).
Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity / Local Uniformity:
Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State
Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 742–43 (2002).
R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and Policy Reasons for
Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 764–65 (2001).
See id. at 765–66 (“For example, if each of 5 decisions independently leading to a sentence recommendation (e.g., use of
a weapon, degree of injury) had a reliability of .90, the final
decision arguably could have a reliability as low as (.90)5 or
.59. A reliability of .90 is considered good, whereas a reliability of .59 is not.”).
Id. at 765 (discussing P. B. Lawrence & P. J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of Relevant Conduct Guidelines, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 330
(1992)).
Id. at 768–69.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 768–69.
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations
Under the Federal Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284,
1285 (1997) (finding that Guidelines circumvented in 20–35
percent of cases).
Frank O. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An
Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data From the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 479–480
(2002).
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 29, at xii (“[A] variety
of evidence developed throughout the guidelines era suggest
that the mechanisms and procedures designed to control disparity arising at the presentencing stages are not all working
as intended and have not been adequate to fully achieve uniformity of sentencing.”).
See, e.g., id. at xiii (discussing nationwide survey of judges
indicating that judges infrequently go behind plea agreements to examine underlying conduct).
See id. at xiii.
Breyer, supra note 6, at 2.
Under an advisory system, of course, judges may mitigate
the false-positive problem by deviating from the Guidelines
on a case-by-case basis. It is unclear, however, how much
freedom judges will have to do so in the new regime. Nor is it
clear how willing judges will be to use whatever freedom they
have to address these concerns.
2005 WL 161223, *1 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
Id. at *2.
Id.
2005 WL 273168, *1 (D. Utah 2005).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *13–14.
See, e.g., Bowman & Heise, supra note 42, at 556; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 29, at 98, 100–01 (discussing
studies). But see id. at 101–02 (reporting new study concluding that district differences account for only 2.8 percent of
variation).
See Michael M. O’Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27
HAMLINE L. REV. 358, 360–365 (2004).
See, e.g., American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section,
Report to the House of Delegates: Recommendation 1 (2005).
O’Hear, supra note 12, at 266–269.

•

APRIL 2005

04.FSR17.4_249-257.qxd

59

60
61
62

63

7/12/05

1:41 PM

Page 257

See Sandra Guerra, The New Sentencing Entrapment and Sentence Manipulation Defenses, 7 FED. SENT. REP. 181 (1995).
O’Hear, supra note 12, at 265–72.
337 U.S. 241, 246–251 (1949).
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755–56
(2005) (merits majority) (“We recognize . . . that in some
cases jury factfinding may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants. But the interest in fairness
and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial . . . has
always outweighed the interest in concluding trials quickly.”).
See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality)
(holding that capital defendants entitled to offer any mitigat-

64

65
66
67

ing evidence at sentencing in light of the “need for treating
each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect
due the uniqueness of the individual”).
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752 (merits majority) (discussing jury
trial right as based on desire to prevent government oppression and preserve civil and political liberties).
See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1991).
My proposal for restructuring the Guidelines, which makes
relevant a broader range of considerations that bear on just
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procedural justice.

FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER

•

V O L . 1 7 , N O. 4

•

APRIL 2005

257

